Sentence examples for physical duplicates from inspiring English sources

For those who characterize physicalism as the thesis that worlds that are physical duplicates of one another are duplicates simpliciter, this response is especially plausible, since talk of "duplication" is typically restricted to qualitative properties.

They thus allow that two worlds could be physical duplicates, but nonetheless differ mentally two worlds that are physically just alike, but only one of which contains a community of disembodied spirits.

LOS ANGELES — The woman in the black-and-white program on the flat-screen TV was teetering on the brink of madness, delivering a disjointed monologue about parallel worlds and the possibility that our own physical duplicates might walk among us.

Assured at first by the town psychiatrist Dr. Dan Kaufman that the cases are nothing but "epidemic mass hysteria," Bennell soon discovers, with the help of his friend Jack Belicec, that the townspeople are in fact being replaced by simulations grown from plantlike pods; perfect physical duplicates who kill and dispose of their human victims.

The Earthling in 1750 and their Twin Earth counterpart are supposed to be intrinsic physical duplicates.

The physical duplicates on Earth and Twin Earth can then be in different functional states corresponding to different belief contents.

(Notice that the idea that (1) captures the minimal commitment of physicalism is a distinct idea from that of a minimal physical duplicate which Jackson uses in his attempt to capture minimal physicalism).

The reason is that W is by assumption a physical duplicate of our world; but then, if physicalism is true at our world, W should be a duplicate simpliciter of our world.

After all, applied to W, Jackson's definition says that physicalism is true at W just in case any minimal physical duplicate of W is a duplicate simpliciter.

But if physicalism is defined according to (1), then physicalism may still be true, for it remains possible that any minimal physical duplicate of the world is a duplicate simpliciter.

For if the relation of the mental to the physical that obtains at W is one of weak necessity, then not only is physicalism false but it is also false that any world which is a physical duplicate of W is a positive duplicate of W — at some physical duplicate worlds, for example, there will be no psychological properties at all.