Maisie, Sophie and Isaac are all phenomenal, and we like to think the excellence of their work will far outshine the fact that they're playing a bit younger than they are.
This move made, Retentional theorists can go on to argue that there is no reason to think that phenomenal successions (and similarly for other temporal properties) cannot reside within episodes of experiencing that are themselves momentary.
Now, the point to note in favor of such an account is that it can explain the natural temptation to think that phenomenal consciousness is in some sense ineffable, or indescribable.
If these bolder theses are correct, then the argument from phenomenal intentionality would give reason to think that all of the propositional attitudes have narrow contents, and that their wide contents, if any, are derived from these narrow contents.
Whether this is the right way to think about phenomenal and qualitative conscious is unclear; perhaps the tie to unified and densely integrated representation is in fact as intimate and constitutive as it seems to be in the case of access consciousness (Carruthers 2000).
Carruthers (1998a,b, 2000) has argued to this effect based on his 'higher-order thought' theory, according to which, phenomenal consciousness requires the capacity to think about, and therefore conceptualize, one's own thoughts.[8] Such conceptualization requires, according to Carruthers, a theory of mind.
"[Y]ou remember the color of the sky on your birthday last year, the year before that, ten years before that, and so on, and your long-term memory gives you good reason to think that the phenomenal character of the experience has not changed….
"I think it's phenomenal to do what Messi has done," he said.
"But if I had no idea who Oprah Winfrey was, I would just be thinking, 'Wow, this is just a phenomenal, phenomenal actress.' I think people are going to see her in this and hunger for her to be in more movies".
