One results from persisting things putatively having different parts at different times.
Things that persist over time are then wholes made up of such parts, and one says that persisting things perdure rather than endure.
Thus persisting things are to be sharply distinguished from events or processes, which precisely do extend through time.
For example, perhaps persisting things stretch out four-dimensionally through time, but without being subdivided into temporal parts.
As well as disagreeing about whether persisting things have temporal parts, philosophers disagree about the nature of time itself.
These are worlds in which things persist through time not by consisting of distinct temporal parts, but rather by bilocation in spacetime: persisting things are wholly present in their entirety at different times.
The problem of temporary intrinsics focuses on the possibility of persisting things changing their properties, or, at least, changing their intrinsic properties.
From that point of view persisting things endure and change through time, but do not extend through time, but only through space.
Vagueness, or indeterminacy, seems to be a feature of our everyday experience of persisting things, and it creates problems which, according to temporal parts theorists, can best be solved by accepting that things have temporal parts.
One way of describing the position of the perdurance theorist, then, is to say that he denies the existence of a distinct ontological category of persisting things, or substances.
