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There has been much interest in examining primates' understanding of perceptual states.
The epistemology of such propositional perceptual states (if they exist) must be addressed elsewhere.
Visua and Twin Visua instantiate perceptual states with different representational properties.
In the terminology of Hawthorne and Kovakovich 2006, we may call these perceptual states "success states".
Likewise, according to dispositional HOT theory, when the 'theory of mind' system has learned to interpret the subject's perceptual states as perceptual states: they all acquire a dimension of seeming or subjectivity.
It seems that a natural explanation for why perceptual states, but not propositional attitudes, are concept-independent is that perceptual states differ from propositional attitudes in the types of contents that are involved.
The observed priming was specific to transformations and did not originate in priming of perceptual states preceding a transient.
Some epistemologists privilege perceptual states that you are in only if you are not in cases of illusion or hallucination.
One crucial question, then, is whether perceptual states as well as beliefs admit of both conscious and unconscious varieties.
Like belief states, other's perceptual states are opaque, and require the attributor to make a distinction between oneself and another.
Leibniz speaks of perceptual states as unfolding spontaneously in monads according to a metaphysically basic order of causal relations.
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Justyna Jupowicz-Kozak
CEO of Professional Science Editing for Scientists @ prosciediting.com