When Eagleman showed them the perceptual chronometer, they looked a little dubious.
Whereas much contemporary discussion of nonconceptual content is focused on the content of conscious perceptual states, it looks very much as if Evans understands perceptual states with nonconceptual content as being non-conscious until the subject's conceptual abilities are brought to bear on them (Campbell 2005).
So whereas modern epistemologists regard intuition, understood as an intellectual seeming or presentation, as something analogous to the non-factive notion of a perceptual experience, it looks like some classic intuitionists regarded intuition as analogous to the factive notion of a perception.
It's a human instinct to try to create perceptual order wherever we look, no matter how much disorder surrounds us.
To support the claim that consciousness doesn't supply perceptual justification, one might look to other real-life cases of unconscious visual representation.
In another study that looked at perceptual richness, fourth- and sixth-grade students were either given perceptually rich bills and coins (i.e., looking similarly to real-world bills and coins) or given bland bills and coins (e.g., white paper with black text indicating the numerical value) to help them solve problems involving money (McNeil, Uttal, Jarvin, & Sternberg, 2009).
Consider the perceptual state of someone looking at an apple.
A generalized version of this account looks to perceptual tasks at a more granular level.
The experimental conditions involved imagining an action (one item from the VMIQ-2) using internal visual imagery, external visual imagery, kinesthetic imagery and a perceptual control condition involved looking at a fixation cross.
A very simple example that illustrates the difference would be one in which a person acquires a justified belief that there is a tomato in front of her on the basis of a perceptual experience of something looking red and spherical.
