The word "percept" is correct and can be used in written English.
You can use it to refer to a basic or intuitive understanding or awareness of something, for example in the sense of having a "sixth sense". For example, "I had a percept of danger before I entered the room."
And neutral monism is the "metaphysic of matter" that bridges the "gulf between physics and perception" (Russell 1927a, 275) by explaining how a percept can result from a purely physical brain process in a nonmiraculous way.
Both achieving and failing to achieve an organized percept must be explained.
To return to the stereoscopic perception of three-dimensional space, one may recapitulate that it is because the two eyes receive different images of the same object that the stereoscopic percept happens; when the two images of the object are identical, then, except under very special conditions, the object has no three-dimensionality.
Where the retinal images overlap, stereoscopic perception is possible and the two fields, in this region, are combined into a single three-dimensional percept.
Where the fields overlap, and different objects are seen by the two eyes e.g., on looking through a window the bars may obscure some objects as seen by one eye but not as seen by the other the final percept is determined by the need to make something intelligible out of the combined fields.
So long as the individual retinal images can be regarded as the visual tokens of an actual arrangement of objects, it is possible to obtain a single percept, and there seems no reason to suppose that the final percept will be greatly influenced by the dominance of one or other eye.
As such, structural features of relations between events not present in the percepts of these events could only be inferred according to general laws; hence, posits of unobserved structural features of the world are constrained by exigencies of inductive inference.
That is, the mystery engendered by the causal theory of perception, will only be dispelled if the intrinsic qualities of the perceptual mechanism is sufficiently similar to that of the percepts it produces.
Later, after abandoning the view that perception is fundamentally relational, and accepting a form of William James's neutral monism, Russell similarly came to believe that the notion of a conscious mind could be analyzed in terms of various percepts, experiences and sensations related to each other by psychological laws (AMi chaps. 1, 5; OOP chap. 26; cf. PLA, 277ff).
While it may be possible to get oneself to believe that the perceptions of the absent-minded car driver can remain phenomenally conscious (perhaps lying outside of the focus of attention, or being instantly forgotten), it is very hard to believe that either blindsight percepts or D.F.'s sensorimotor perceptual states might be phenomenally conscious ones.
Must these unconscious percepts also be lacking in phenomenal properties?
