Here was the payoff: The cost of installing the cards at, say, a corporation would be proportional to the number of cards installed.
Let e i, h i and λ i be the expected payoff, handling cost and local density of a prey of type i.
In a game with incomplete information, in contrast, at the minimum one firm is unsure about another firm's payoff or cost functions.
We can augment the model above by introducing such a payoff or cost associated with the signals.
First, we can impose a variety of additional payoff (or cost) structures associated with the signaling strategies that are exogenous to the setting of indirect reciprocity.
Economic analysis shows that reduced aircraft costs could payoff the capital cost of a traverse fleet within a single season.
It may be that thieves targeted these rare cars based on specialized evaluation of the expected payoffs, handling costs, or both, made at the time of encounter.
Car theft may be considered a special case of prey selection if car types vary in expected payoffs, handling costs and/or local abundance and offenders are attentive to these differences.
In a practical cognitive radio environment, each SU has the knowledge of its payoffs and costs, but it does not know about the strategies and profits of the other SUs.
Prey types i = 1, 2, … N are ranked in descending order of the ratio of payoff to handling cost e i /h i.
