Although theories of global justice vary, when a global institution such as medical tourism systematically disadvantages some and benefits others in terms of their access to health care, this pattern of distribution is a matter of concern to global justice (1).
In other words, even if we allow that continuity comes in degrees, it is not entirely clear why our patterns of concern ought to track the amount and not simply the fact of continuity.
Nevertheless, it surely seems most plausible to retain the patterns of concern formerly grounded on identity and simply find a new justification for them.
Now one important problem for this view is that it is very difficult to see why my patterns of concern should track this particular ego, and not instead the psychological features constituting Relation R. What is it about this substance that warrants my special prudential concern, for example?
What Butler and Reid retain in common with Locke, though, is the belief that identity grounds certain of our patterns of concern, both prudential and moral.
Of course, there may simply be no single relation appropriate for grounding all our patterns of concern, i.e., some patterns of concern may be grounded in biological continuity, some may be grounded in psychological continuity or connectedness, and some may target simple momentary experiences.
But if R grounds my patterns of concern, and a reduced degree of connectedness is one part of R, then a reduced degree of connectedness justifies a reduced degree of concern.
Detection of unoriginal materials in essays and reports through manual observation is reliant on the identification of irregularities or patterns of concern (Rogerson, 2014) as at this time technology can only detect some but not all cases of plagiarism and contract cheating (Dahl, 2007; Rogerson & McCarthy, 2017).
Additional evaluations of subjects with a ≥20% decrease in DL co or alterations in PFTs did not reveal any patterns of concern in MOR103-treated patients (see online supplementary text).
