The phrase "paradigmatic instance" is a valid and usable phrase in written English.
It typically refers to a specific example or illustration of a larger concept or idea. Example: "The scientist used a paradigmatic instance of a chemical reaction to demonstrate the potential effects of climate change on the environment."
The opening chapter of Origen's First Principles is a paradigmatic instance of his application of philosophic reasoning to biblical exegesis.
Thus Paley's use of the term 'inference' in connection with the watch's designer.[2] The watch does play an obvious and crucial role but as a paradigmatic instance of design inferences rather than as the analogical foundation for an inferential comparison.
The fact that Parfit clearly thinks that his distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is just the same as Nagel's distinction also suggests that Parfit's distinction is well understood as principle-based, since Nagel's version of the distinction is a paradigmatic instance of a principle-based version of the distinction.
Faced with the question 'Is X an artwork?', what we should do is try to detect strands of resemblance with paradigmatic instances of an artwork.
But the paradigmatic instances of "association" are, first, the "joint impressions" that generate "ideas" (including complex movements), and second, the flowing cascades of movement that are decomplex actions.
It is not clear, at the outset, that we are warranted in taking them to be paradigmatic instances of a genuine epistemological kind.
So even if we keep a single conception of objectivity as fixed there will be great controversy over whether seemingly paradigmatic instances of agent-relativity really are such.
Adapting this approach to our present concern, the suggestion is that we formulate an account of certainty in light of paradigmatic instances of beliefs held with certainty.
To take these as the paradigmatic instances of knowledge invites a model of the knower as emotionally detached, impersonally oriented to things rather than persons, and oriented in an "objective" posture toward the object of knowledge.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the proposed reading of the distinction would sort other paradigmatic instances of agent-relativity and agent-neutrality in an intuitively satisfying way.
A relatively restrictive account of introspection might require introspection to involve attention to and direct detection of one's ongoing mental states; but many philosophers think attention to or direct detection of mental states is impossible or at least not present in many paradigmatic instances of introspection.
