Sentence examples for outer sense from inspiring English sources

Kant's suggestion in the passage above appears to be that intuition must somehow have its seat in the subject it must somehow be a "form" of the mind, or more precisely, of what Kant calls here "outer sense".

If inner-sense theory were true, then how is it that there isn't any phenomenology distinctive of inner sense, in the way that there is a phenomenology associated with each outer sense?

Kant (1781/1997) says we have an "inner sense" by which we learn about mental aspects of ourselves that is in important ways parallel to the "outer sense" by which we learn about outer objects.

Thus, the particular kinds of things that could be investigated in a special metaphysics are (i) the objects of outer sense, i.e., matter, and (ii) the objects of inner sense, i.e., thinking beings, which would thus result in a doctrine of body and a doctrine of soul.

Yet, in the beginning of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, he describes it as whatever is an object of outer sense, and later he argues that the "basic determination of something that is to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these senses be affected" (4:476).

If, by contrast, impenetrability, extension, and movability are deemed the basic traits of the concept of matter, then how can one know a priori that any object we might encounter in outer sense must behave in accordance with the laws that would govern matter so defined?

The outer senses apprehend only the present objects, the inner senses (manas, antahkarana, and buddhi) have the ability to apprehend all objects past, present, and future.

Particulars comprise sense-data, thoughts, feelings, desires and memories of "things which have been data either of the outer senses or of the inner sense" (ibid., 51).

Phenomenalism holds statements to be cognitively significant if they can be reduced to statements about about one's experience, be it outer (senses) or inner (introspection).

Since each of the outer senses gives rise to a distinctive set of phenomenological properties, one might expect that if there were such a thing as inner sense, then there would also be a phenomenology distinctive of its operation.

Natorp quotes Wundt: "'There is no such thing as an inner sense that could, as an organ of psychic perception, be contrasted with the outer senses as the organs of the knowledge of nature [Naturerkenntnis]'" (Wundt, [1896a], §1,1; quoted at Natorp, 1912: 264).