First, rather than cooperating unconditionally, our cooperator partners played Tit-For-Tat and, therefore, were not as easily identifiable as cooperators.
Our cooperator designed a new peptide GAP159 through amino acid substitution, which, theoretically, had strong interaction with G3BP and was more stable.
Note that our specification that when cooperators dominate (p = 1), the equilibrium level of public good is normalised to one (ie e*(p = 1) = c/u = 1), entails c and u are expressed in units ensuring c = u.
If so, then our answer is yes, pure cooperators indeed do better than pure cheaters.
Third, we control for whether or not someone contributed to the group account in the prisoner's dilemma stage, since our preliminary analyses indicated that cooperators are more likely to punish defectors.
Our use of the terms "cooperators" and "cheaters" refers to social behaviors within the commons (e.g., soma), and this should be distinguished from the frequent usage of "cheaters" as cooperative somatic lineages trying to gain access to germ line (e.g., [ 1, 5, 8, 10, 22]).
In our model, a preferential association of cooperators can also emerge.
According to him, we are by nature cooperators, although at first we cooperate only with members of our own family.
Some form of cooperation is required, and cooperators gain access to resources not available to non-cooperators.
