In the course of explaining the moral sentiments, Hutcheson's idea of an original moral sense disappears from Hume's account of morality.
The only other features that all of the original descriptive moralities have in common is that they are put forward by a group, usually a society and they provide a guide for the behavior of the people in that group or society.
In the sense most closely related to the original descriptive sense, "morality" refers to a guide to behavior put forward by some group other than a society, for example, a religious group.
The original descriptive sense of "morality," parallel to the descriptive senses of "etiquette" and "law," has two formal features: that morality is a code of conduct that is put forward by a society and that members of that society accept it as a guide for their behavior.
The recognition that people in a society do not always accept the code of conduct their society puts forward presents problems for the original descriptive sense of "morality".
The original descriptive definition of "morality" refers to the most important code of conduct put forward by a society and accepted by the members of that society.
The original descriptive definition of "morality" refers to an actual code of conduct put forward by a society and accepted by the members of that society.
But, in the original descriptive sense of "morality," beyond some concern with avoiding and preventing harm to some others, there may be no common content, nor may there be any common justification that those who accept the morality claim for it.
Nietzsche often thought of his writings as struggles with nihilism, and apart from his critiques of religion, philosophy, and morality he developed original theses that have commanded attention, especially perspectivism, the will to power, eternal recurrence, and the superman.
