Sentence examples for ordinary utterances from inspiring English sources

Constitutionalists have maintained that the 'is' in ordinary utterances like 'the lump is now a statue' is not an 'is' of identity but rather an 'is' of constitution.

McGrath (2005) and Nolan (2010) show how counterparts of the arguments for eliminativism cause trouble for the ordinary utterances that compatibilist eliminativists wish to affirm.

Eliminativists have claimed that ordinary utterances of 'there are statues' are instances of "loose talk" or that they are context-sensitive.

Some prominent types of fictionalism claim only that in ordinary utterances of sentences of some discourse, speakers don't aim at literal truth.

The content fictionalist holds that in (ordinary) utterances of sentences of D some content is asserted, but what is asserted is something other than their literal content.

Permissivists of various stripes have defended views according to which ordinary utterances about how many things there are still manage to come out true.

One can be a use fictionalist while holding that one's view is about what proposition is expressed in an ordinary utterance of a relevant sentence.

The force fictionalist holds that the content expressed in an (ordinary) utterance of a sentence of D is not asserted: instead some other speech act is performed.

It is not universally agreed that an ordinary utterance of (16) is indirect, since it has been denied (e.g., by Levinson 1983: 273 6) that a question has really been asked, over and above the request.

A fictionalist can hold both that in an (ordinary) utterance of sentence of D, the literal content of the sentence is conveyed but not asserted, and that some content other than the literal content is asserted.

This is even a rather natural view: in an ordinary utterance of a sentence of D, the speaker pretends-true the literal content of the sentence, and in so doing she asserts something other than the literal content.