In postmodernity, we find a critical supplement to the tradition of first-order wisdom.
Our differentiation between first- and second-order wisdom does more than merely supplement Hargadon and Sutton's notion of wisdom.
On this basis, we argue that the wisdom of the intermediary involves mastering different roles, functions, and ways-of-being (first-order wisdom), and deciding between them in each individual situation of intermediation (second-order wisdom).
This enables us to have a two-level concept of wisdom that acknowledges that the intermediary has to master different roles wisely (first-order wisdom) and to decide wisely between them in each individual situation of intermediation (second-order wisdom).
On this basis, we argue that the wisdom of the intermediary involves mastering the different roles (first-order wisdom) and deciding between them in each individual situation of intermediation (second-order wisdom).
We therefore argue that intermediation requires the exercise of the exact same kind of second-order wisdom that we find in the writings of Caputo.
Instead, the wisdom of the intermediary in its totality must also include the second-order wisdom that takes into account the plurality of norms available in every situation.
But we can only fully grasp what it takes to be a wise intermediary in the world when we acknowledge that the intermediary has to master different roles (first-order wisdom) and to decide between them in each individual situation of intermediation (second-order wisdom).
Using the terms of this paper, we can describe the understanding of wisdom within the Aristotelian tradition as "first-order wisdom," since wisdom is taken to mean the capacity to merge the common and the singular in the situation.
"second-order wisdom," the ability to reflect on the different roles, functions, and ways-of-being that are available in a situation, and from this multitude decide on which role, function, and way-of-being will be most helpful; and.
