Sentence examples for order attitudes from inspiring English sources
One popular approach has been to suggest that conditional judgements are higher order attitudes aimed at the judgements that would be expressed by the sentences which they embed.
These higher order attitudes might either be complex beliefs (Blackburn 1971) or further non-cognitive judgments (Blackburn 1984) expressed by the corresponding complex sentences.
These higher order attitudes might either be complex beliefs (Blackburn 1971) or further non-cognitive judgments (Blackburn 1984) expressed by the complex sentences.
Gibbard glosses negation of the judgement that X is permissible as an attitude of ruling out a set of lower order attitudes, those involved in the various plans to do X.
One such approach has been to suggest that the complex moral or normative judgements are higher order attitudes aimed at the judgements that would be expressed by the sentences which they embed.
And non-cognitivists have responded with increasingly more sophisticated proposals about the logic of attitudes, including several proposals that do not employ higher order attitudes (Blackburn 1988b; Gibbard 1990, 2003; Horgan and Timmons 2006b; Schroeder 2008a, 2008b, 2008c).
Not every sentence which expresses a higher order attitude in an everyday sense of expression may stand in the semantic expression relation that expressivists postulate.
When I morally disapprove of something, I also have these higher-order attitudes towards my own attitudes: I prefer not to desire what I disapprove of.
On this hierarchical account of agency, the role of higher-order attitudes is essential to the kind of agency that distinguishes persons from other agents.
Unlike the coherentists, however, the reasoning-responsive theorists believe that there is more to the capacity for self-reflection than the capacity to hold higher-order attitudes.
The authority of our higher-order attitudes is grounded, they claim, in the authority of the practical reasoning that supports these attitudes.
