Sentence examples for ontological reason from inspiring English sources

There is, however, no deep ontological reason why we could not change our view of what the constitutive and what the instantiating properties are, and thereby describe the very same situation in terms of different individuals and properties.

Unless there is some ontological reason to prefer people to sets of people (perhaps because sets are never to be preferred), the ontologies of M and QM seem pretty much on a par.

For this reason, on Sartre's model, social reality is in perpetual conflict an Hegelian dialectic in which, for ontological reasons, no state of mutual recognition can ever be achieved.

A key aspect of Kitcher's argument is that an epistemic account of reduction fails for ontological reasons, by not capturing the natural kind structure of chromosomal phenomena studied by classical genetics.

Nor does it seem to exclude a variety of ontological views about reasons as the reason-statement-based version of the distinction did.

The reason-statement-based approach to the distinction is tenable on certain ontological views about reasons but seems useless on a wide variety of other plausible ontological views about reasons.

So whereas Nagel's principle-based version of the distinction excludes particularists, Pettit's reason-statement-based version of the distinction excludes those who hold any of a wide range of ontological views about reasons.

Given this package of ontological views, the reason-statement-based version of the distinction looks unhelpful.

Most significantly, this version of the distinction seems to presuppose a particular ontology of reasons, in which case we end up inviting particularists to the agent-relative/agent-neutral party only by rescinding the invitations of those who hold opposing ontological views about reasons.

As we saw Longchen's definition is based on two radically opposed epistemic criteria whereas Mipham's definition, as we shall see, has two radically opposed ontological criteria one that withstands reasoned analysis and the other that does not withstand reasoned analysis.

This is not to make an ontological claim about power or reason (e.g. 'power and reason are essentially warlike').