Regardless of the standard, requiring patents to be asserted only by practicing entities (or entities practicing the invention) would be an insignificant burden for any well-funded asserting entity.
According to the intuition of normality theories this seems to be counterintuitive, because cp-laws should be asserted only if the situation without (non-negligible) disturbing factor is a normal or at least a rather probable situation.
According to interpretation α, A → B just means A ∧ B with the extra information that the construction for B was obtained from that for A. On this reading A → B can be asserted only after a construction for A has been found.
If one insisted, contrary to the reading deemed sympathetic, that a being must satisfy all three criteria as robots do not since they lack felt needs in order to qualify as living, the same may be asserted not only of insentient animal life but also of presentient human fetuses and of unconscious human beings of any age.
This was particularly objectionable to mathematicians of a "constructive" bent such as the so-called French Empiricists Baire, Borel and Lebesgue, for whom a mathematical object could be asserted to exist only if it can be defined in such a way as to characterize it uniquely.
Now recall that in a dialogue, the formal restriction SR-5 says in substance that only what is asserted by O can be assumed to be true, and therefore that O is the builder of the model.
Recently, John Turri (2013) has published results from a series of survey studies, where the aim was to determine whether speakers accept a factive or a non-factive norm: the norm is factive in case an assertion is proper only if what is asserted is true, otherwise non-factive.
A sentence is possible only if what is asserted is not always non-actual (I.124-125).
The claim to France was only nominal, and was asserted by every English King from Edward III to George III, regardless of the amount of French territory actually controlled.
