Though 504 plans for anxiety vary by student, a typical one might allow a teenager to take more time on homework and tests, enter the school through a back door — to avoid the chaos of the main entrance — and leave a classroom when feeling anxious.
Alternatively, one might allow that an experience can be characterized determinately but deny that one typically has acquaintance with the experience's having that particular determinate character.
For example, one might allow, as does Moser's theory discussed in the foregoing, that one merely have a de re awareness of the evidential relation holding between the reason and the belief.
In principle, one might allow nonmembers to pose new objections to their dues payments biannually, or quarterly, or even once a month, as actual expenses do, or do not, correspond to initial union predictions.
(One might allow that very non-virtuous persons deserve some level of bad fortune or negative well-being).
Along the same line, one might allow that desert reasons compete with equality or priority reasons, but give decisively less weight to desert reasons.
One might allow that the property exists even that it exists at the actual world but deny that it is instantiated.
(There is a little bit of slippage here: one might allow for the evaluations, but then insist that these could not figure into practical reasoning. But this would be an awkward way of resisting the conclusion).
That is, one might allow for the sake of argument the natural law theorist's identification of some range of human goods, while denying that he or she can identify, and justify in natural law terms, adequately concrete modes of appropriate response to those goods.
Alternatively, one might allow the parameters to vary with time, possibly according to a random process with drift, but this simple setup suffices to demonstrate the viability of the overall approach.
