Gregoriev also treats Wright's understanding of objectivity in knowledge, a topic touched upon in Section 5 below.
Not all feminist approaches are antirealist, but nearly all are normative, offering prescriptions for revising both scientific practice and concepts such as objectivity and knowledge that have direct implications for realism.
The claim that the 'I' of apperception yields no object of knowledge (for it is not itself an object, but only the "vehicle" for any representation of objectivity as such) is fundamental to Kant's critique of rational psychology.
As a form of realism, it offers to make robust sense of moral objectivity and moral knowledge, allowing for moral utterances to be truth-apt in straightforward ways and for some of them to be true.
From the formalist point of view of the logicist and neo-Kantian traditions, Carnap's models of unity expressed his concern with the possibility of objectivity in scientific knowledge.
The non-formal, empirical, perspective, allied to the 'scientific attitude', became in 1931 Neurath's physicalism, his compromise between empiricism and materialism Mach and Marx—; this was also his attempt at a resolution of the conflict between experience and objectivity (of scientific knowledge), which Carnap attempted through the formal aspect of structural descriptions and logical relations.
Talking fast seems to indicate confidence, intelligence, objectivity and superior knowledge.
The problematic conceptions of objectivity ignore the knowledge-enhancing, epistemically fruitful uses of supposedly "feminine" approaches to theorizing (e.g., uses of emotional engagement and explicit attention to perspectival knowledge).
Since conceptions of knowers carry normative weight, making distinctions between those who know and those who don't, or between those who know more or less well, feminist discussions of situated knowers are very much integrated with their discussions of the objectivity and justification of knowledge claims (see Section 3: Social Models of Knowledge and Objectivity).
But since on this interpretation of Kant the a priori is subjective, an explanation of knowledge's objectivity must appeal not to it, but to the objects that exist independently of the mind.
