We then demonstrate the applicability of these principles to four specific domains of infant perception and/or cognition, (i.e., form perception, object unity, complex pattern perception, and understanding of causal events).
This is Tye's object unity; Bayne and Chalmers' objectual unity is at least a related notion.
Tye (2003, pp. 11 5), for example, distinguishes object unity, neurophysiological unity, spatial unity, subject unity, introspective unity, and, finally, phenomenal unity.
As we saw, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of synthesis, being conscious of individual objects (Tye's object unity) and being conscious of a number of objects at the same time.
Similarly, Bayne and Chalmers (2003, pp. 24 7) distinguish objectual unity (a matter of two conscious experiences of one object, so different from Tye's object unity), spatial unity, subject unity, and subsumptive unity, the last a matter of two or more conscious states becoming aspects of a single conscious state.
Various aspects of chimpanzee visual cognition have been behaviorally explored, including categorical color perception [2], visual illusions [3], perception of object unity [4], global and local processing of visual elements [5], [6], and recognition of pictorial representations [7].
In the narrow sense, an entity is an object whose unity is independent of our consciousness.
It also presupposes the knowledge of what constitutes the objects' internal unity and plurality.
Thus, the constitution of the object is the unity of the acts of consciousness, the unity of all of the profiles with the internal horizon, and the external horizon.
It is that through the aesthetic process itself, in the very act of concentrating energies on an art object of great unity and complexity and depth, a kind of inner clarification is achieved that was not present before.
Still, he does not object to some unity of matter.
