Sentence examples for object statement from inspiring English sources

A material object statement like P, therefore, doesn't entail sensory conditionals like (S & A) → (h E.

However, Chisholm argued, for any material object statement P and for any sensory conditional (S & A) → (h E, there will be some other material object statement M about the circumstances of perception that is consistent with P, such that P and M can both be true while (S & A) → (h E is false.

The sensory conditionals (S & A) → E and (S & A) → (h E can be true, as can the material object statement P that entails them, quite apart from the truth of the expressive statements S and A, or indeed, the presence of any empirical data warranting their assertion.

Chisholm (1948) raised the most important challenge to Lewis' claim that a physical object statement P entails and is entailed by a set of counterfactual statements expressing claims about what experiences one would have were one to (seem to) carry out certain tests upon being presented with certain sensory cues.

The proposed reductions of, say, material object statements to sensory ones were often fairly complex, had to be studied and learned, and so could hardly be uninformative.

The latter, on the other hand, if true, are analytically true, knowable a priori, with zero intension, and entailed by any statement whatsoever, and so can hardly constitute the empirical meaning of contingently true material object statements.

Even when the relativization to other background material object statements isn't explicit, the probability statement would seem to be implicitly relative to some background assumption of material normality.

In other words, Lewis would have to abandon his reductionism and agree with Quine's holistic conclusion that individual material object statements like P have "no fund of experiential implications to call their own" (Quine 1969, 79).

However, a schema can and is still created by recognizing that: different variations make up a single discursive object; statements that make up a discourse are organized by form and connection; discourse is determined by more permanent and coherent concepts; and statements are grouped and regrouped according to themes [7].

This is something that Lewis arguably denied, as we shall see in the next two sections, by arguing that there can be conditionals about expected experience (constituting the empirical content of material object statements) the antecedents of which consist solely of statements about experience that can be given and thus certain for us).

The justification for them thus will presuppose prior knowledge of the truth of material object statements like P and M, perhaps in the way Chisholm suggests, rather than explain how we can know such propositions solely on the basis of present and past experience of the given.