Through this exhibition, MAD will explore a monumental transition in the way human beings understand creation, from the earliest objects conceived and produced by individual makers through the tools of technological innovation.
Since antiquity, a majority of mathematicians had carefully avoided the introduction into their arguments of the actual infinite (i.e., of sets containing an infinity of objects conceived as existing simultaneously, at least in thought).
The set designer, Jean Paul Chambas, a prominent French painter, has created an elaborate, snow-covered Versailles garden on a floor canvas and incorporated conical trees that open up to become props and furniture, details from paintings by Fragonard and Francis Bacon and three-dimensional replicas of surrealist objects conceived by Salvador Dali.
In emphasizing this last point, Kant identifies metaphysics with an effort to acquire knowledge of "objects" conceived, but in no wise given (or giveable) to us in experience.
Thus, Quine writes, "physical objects, conceived thus four-dimensionally in space-time, are not to be distinguished from events, or, in the concrete sense of the term, processes.
His target is a purely sense-datum experience, which does not feature objects, "conceived of as distinct from any particular states of awareness of them," that is, a Berkeleyan experience of spatial objects whose esse is percipi (1966: 98).
Seeking to preserve as much as possible of the common sense notion of material objects he argues for the existence of such objects conceived of as having "primary qualities" such as shape, size, and position (apart from such properties as electric charge and mass).
MetaProx is the database of metagenomic proximons: a searchable repository of proximon objects conceived with two specific goals.
And most typically (though by no means necessarily, given the varieties of Platonism), such an 'independent' object is conceived of as a material object or body that is, very roughly, as a substance in the full and traditional Aristotelian sense.
It claims in effect that a proposition's structure is that of a complex object made up out of simple objects, where these simple objects are conceived in the Russellian manner as objects of inner perception or acquaintance, and the complexes which they compose are conceived in the phenomenalist manner as (epistemological and/ or semantic) constructs out of those simple objects.
