Since and are strongly indefinite functinals, we use the notion of the condition and the limit relative category instead of the notion of condition and the relative category, which are the useful tools for the proofs of the main theorems.
In Section 2, we introduce some notations and some notions of condition and the limit relative category and recall the critical point theory on the manifold with boundary.
In his illuminating contribution to the Schilpp volume, Georg Henrik von Wright writes: "as far as I know [Broad] is the first to have given systematic attention to the logic of the various notions of condition" (1959, p. 341).
This may well be true in the context of theories confined to describing each population using a single variable, but the limitation of such theories in addressing questions that incorporate physiological notions of condition, stress, health, climate change and so on are evident.
The notion of accuracy conditions also leaves it open whether there could be accuracy conditions that were met whenever a subject had an experience with those conditions.
However, the notion of accuracy conditions that defines the notion of content we've been working with leaves it open whether those conditions pertain to the world outside the mind or not.
Wang introduced in [6] the notion of Lipschitz conditions with L-average to unify both Kantorovich's and Smale's criteria.
One reason that it's difficult to judge the force of this objection is that the notion of "normal conditions", even given Leplin's clarifications, remains vague (which is not obviously a problem with the analysis; cf. Leplin 2009).
