Finally, recent discussions have revived interest in important questions about the nature of intention and its distinctiveness as a mental state, and about the norms governing rational intending.
Second, the objection can be construed as motivated by the fact that some constructivists appeal, in developing their views, to the idea that the norms of rational choice have a constitutive status.
One way to interpret these cases is to say that the person's reasoning falls so far short of the norms of "rational reflection" that she is not really reasoning at all.
To have different credences in A and 'Actually A iff A', even though they express the same proposition when A is actually true, is to violate some widely accepted (though not uncontroversial) norms on rational credence.
In sum, the moral norms that rational contractors will adopt (and comply with), according to Gauthier, are those norms that would be reached by the contractors beginning from a position each has attained through her own actions which have not worsened anyone else, and adopting as their principle for agreement the rule of minimax relative concession.
Igor Douven (2006, 2009) argues for a norm of rational belief.
Although critical moving-bed transport is difficult to achieve in practice, it sets the norm for rational design and operation.
Yet we may still claim that conformity to a norm is rational, and explain it in terms of one's beliefs and desires, even though one does not conform out of a conscious rational calculation.
We come to recognise rational norms historically, as actualised; we always reason in terms of the norms of our society, which we must nonetheless endorse only reflectively.
If Kolodny were correct, then the rational norms on intention would be explicable by appeal to the same principles as the norms on belief, and any other normatively assessable attitudes and would moreover be, at best, pseudo-norms, or principles that merely appear normative to us.
