The phrase "normative logic" is correct and usable in written English.
It can be used in discussions related to philosophy, ethics, or decision-making frameworks that involve norms or standards.
Example: "In normative logic, we evaluate arguments based on their adherence to moral principles."
Alternatives: "prescriptive logic" or "evaluative logic".
For Popper a theory of scientific knowledge was to be not a subjective or descriptive account, but a normative logic of justification and demarcation.
But she gives no evidence for this claim, and does not address my argument that they rest on a different normative logic.
Nor is it right, Husserl thinks, to accuse psychologism of circularity; some critics of psychologism had argued that one cannot base normative logic on psychology since psychology itself has some of its foundations in logic.
The analysis suggests that a normative logic of light touch regulation was of particular importance within the wider UK policy context from within which CICs emerged and that the CIC Regulator acts as a mediator of disclosure information across multiple user constituencies.
In my paper, I argued that this should not be surprising, since everyday sociability rests on a different normative logic than that of a social-democratic welfare state: an ethic of hospitality and conviviality is not the same as an ethic of social justice.
However, regarding the key issue of case-filing logic, normative studies of mainstream legal scholarship lack detailed empirical materials for analysis.
Even the normative character of logic had, in his view, to be given a psychological interpretation.[87] Inevitably Wundt was accused of logical psychologism the all-purpose term of abuse flung about in fin-de-siècle German philosophical debate.
An influential contrasting non-cognitivist approach to explaining the logic of normative sentences and attitudes starts from the other end, postulating norms governing combinations of attitude that do not (much) depend on prior relations of implication or consistency among their contents.
But then how can there be a logic of normative sentences, since logic is the study of what follows from what, and one thing can follow from another only if the things in question are the sort that can be either true or false?
The view rests on an idea that is sometimes captured with the slogan that logic is normative, where this means, roughly, that logic has consequences for how we ought to reason.
The result, if all goes according to plan, is a logic for normative terms which generates all the entailments that would be generated if moral terms contributed only descriptive content.
