Long-term, intensive and close interaction does not seem to be necessary for a person to acquire a given normative disposition, as is testified by the relative ease with which individuals learn new norms when they change status or social group (e.g., from single to married, from student to faculty, etc).
To illustrate: According to Davidson, meaning supervenes upon non-semantic, non-normative dispositions to hold (uninterpreted) sentences true.
They observe that we need to postulate basic dispositions of normative responsiveness to account for the capacity of theoretical reflection about reasons to affect our beliefs, and question why these same dispositions cannot explain the fact that practical reasoning is practical in its consequences.
What matters, then, is the width of the gap between the descriptive and the normative, between the (structure of the) dispositions most people have and the (structure of the) dispositions that count as virtues.
For instance, where teachers from the majority group in post-conflict situations display negative dispositions against non-normative groups (Bush and Saltarelli 2000:15), certain sentiments are employed to justify their in/actions.
Disposition location for our sample was compared to the disposition location drawn from national normative discharge data.
Is there a 'normative fit' between EU norms and the local normative context?
It arises when conditions of normative threat trigger protective reactions by those with the disposition.
By "normative commitment" we essentially refer to the constellation of values, principles, dispositions, and strategies that come to inform and guide one's behaviour either tacitly or explicitly.
In this vein, Wedgwood argues more generally that it is only "rational" dispositions that determine intentional content (where rationality is taken to be a normative property; cf. Wedgwood 2007, 167ff; 2009).
