Following dissatisfaction with responses of type (1) and (3) one accepts the applicability and validity of classical norms of reasoning.
To start with the mildest departure from norms of reasoning: our thinking, including our moral thinking, is often not explicit.
While this criticism is addressed especially to Kantian constructivism, it threatens other sorts of constructivist views that appeal to constitutive norms of reasoning (Ripstein 1987; Enoch 2006, 2011b).
Absent a Chinese or Daoist logic, then, the challenge for a more critical philosophical view is showing that Daoists took a reflective, second level, meta-stance in discussing these issues and how (or whether) the more religious conclusions could survive reflection according to the norms of reasoning enshrined in the philosophical high-tide of the classical period of thought.
He explains this away, however, partly on grounds that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, which creates strong "practical pressure" to confabulate or exaggerate in claiming to know things, so that we can view ourselves as reasoning and acting appropriately, even though usually the best we can do is to approximate appropriate action and reasoning.
Eventually, such empirical work on our moral reasoning may yield revisions in our norms of moral reasoning.
An alternative explanation of moral dumbfounding looks to social norms of moral reasoning (Sneddon 2007).
This article is principally concerned with philosophical issues posed by our current norms of moral reasoning.
One concern is that there appears to be no way to extract any specific norms of analogical reasoning from the algorithms and coding conventions.
But for them, such facts depend on the responses of rational agents or those who follow norms of practical reasoning in suitable conditions (for a general account, see James 2007).
