It has been suggested that a mental state has content only if there are certain norms in force for it.
Appealing to constitutive rules thus would mean accepting what we call MD normativism: It would mean accepting that expressions have meaning because there are rules or norms in force for their use.
Of course no answer is to be found in a claim that certain norms are in force or that a powerful being commanded something since, in both cases, nothing about what ought to be done follows from these claims without assuming some further moral claim (e.g. that one ought to obey the norms in force or that one owes allegiance to the powerful being).
Or do such things have (a certain) meaning/content because certain norms are in force?
A wider characterization of constitutive norms or rules thus counts rules or norms as constitutive of a certain action, or activity, A iff A cannot be performed, or engaged in, unless these norms are in force (cf. Glüer & Pagin 1999).
Finally, there is a fundamental question that is not discussed at all: In virtue of what is a norm of assertion in force for a speaker or a speech community, if it is in force?
Many argue that, while Moore's argument shows that thinking something is good is different than thinking it is pleasant (or the object of a desire, or such as to conform to some norm that is in force), it does not show that being good is different from being pleasant (or the object of a desire, or such as to conform to some norm that is in force).
Norms are legally valid within a given system, they have to form part of a system of norms that is in force in a given place and time.
Metaphysically speaking, are certain norms valid, or in force, because certain things – such as linguistic expressions/intentional states – have certain meanings/contents?
"Hazardous levels of alcohol consumption are the norm in the armed forces, regardless of service or gender.
