This complex theory of signification and its subversion is often referred to as negative theology: affirming our affirmations, then negating them, and then negating the negations to ensure that we do not make an idol out of a God about whom we know nothing.
If one accepts double negation elimination, then it makes no sense for both existence and nonexistence to be negated, unless these negations are qualified in certain ways.
He also distinguished negations from affirmations and took the negation particle to have narrow scope: it negates the predicate, not the whole sentence (Soph. 257b c).
These negations must be distinguished from privations.
Stoic negations and conjunctions are truth-functional.
Then, one will come to directly realize all four negations simultaneously.
According to Śāntarakṣita, the problem of circularity is thus avoided by a proper understanding of implicative negations: to understand cow one need not understand non-cow, but rather the mere idea of cow.
On the other hand, implicative negations, while denying the existence of one thing, imply the existence of another.
He misses the two types of implicative negations that Śāntarakṣita clearly specifies as included among forms of exclusions.
For example, Kumārila charges that the Buddhist apoha theories are counter-intuitive in that our intuition is not that words and concepts refer to negations or exclusions.
Nonetheless, bC is decomposed into several copies of a three-valued logic by means of possible-translations as follows: consider the signature C1 = {¬1,¬2, ○1, ○2, ○3, ∧, ∨, →} consisting of two negations, three consistency operators, a conjunction, a disjunction and an implication.
