And they took our specific judgments (for instance, in Moore's case, "I know that I have hands") to be, in general, more secure than more general judgments (for instance, again in Moore's case, "I know things about external reality").
Some subjects were assigned to a concrete condition, and asked to make a judgment about a specific individual in specific circumstances, while others were assigned to an abstract condition, and asked to make a more general judgment, divorced from any particular individual.
Kant's view that judgments of beauty manifest the exercise of a more general faculty of judgment have inspired a number of philosophers to view aesthetic judgment as a model for judgment generally in both the cognitive and the practical domain.
Accordingly much of the secondary literature on Kant's aesthetics has treated it in isolation from the more general account of judgment in which it is embedded, and the same is true, perhaps to an even greater extent, in the case of Kant's teleology.
In both cases specific judgments (concerning observations or the badness of a certain act, for instance) are tentatively accepted and an attempt is made to make sense of them by appeal to more general principles that explain the judgments.
When the more general principles are available the specific judgments are taken as evidence for the principles and the principles reciprocate by helping to justify the thought that the specific judgments are accurate.
Doing this inevitably brings out conflicts where, for example, a specific judgment clashes with a more general conviction, or where an abstract principle cannot accommodate a particular kind of case.
Sometimes indeed we revise our more particular judgments in light of some general principle to which we adhere; but we are also free to revise more general principles in light of some relatively concrete considered judgment.
In a phenomenon known as attribute substitution, we substitute the most immediately available, recent information for more general — and relevant — information when we make a judgment or a decision.
This indicates that this difference in response time slope values between the modalities is notspecific to numerosity judgment and originates from a more general difference in processing of information.
Viewed from the opposite direction, in reflective equilibrium one's abstract beliefs explain one's more general convictions which in turn explain one's specific judgments.
