Among other important discussions of internalism about reasons, it is maybe worth singling out Smith 1994, chapter 3. Much of this is concerned with Foot's "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in her 1978, still perhaps the locus classicus.
Yet her comparison, in a well-known paper (Morality As a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 1972) between Immanuel Kant's view of moral law as "inescapable" in some special way, and the demands of etiquette, was intended to argue that people who follow either morality or etiquette without questioning them "are relying on an illusion, as if trying to give the moral 'ought' a magic force".
Jake, on the other hand, a representative male moral reasoner, reasons from the justice perspective, seeing morality as a set of traffic rules that amount to pursuing one's own interests without interfering with the interests of others.
So if we do not at first detect in Martin's universe a reliable moral vision, perhaps it is because we misapprehend morality as a consistent way of acting, rather than as a way of being in the world that exposes ourselves to the needs of others and discovers our common humanity in our shared vulnerability.
While science cannot dictate specific values or moral principles, it can, nonetheless, explain several dimensions of morality as a form of behavior.
To describe morality as a practice is not to prescribe any particular moral rule.
While these views differed among themselves as to what goodness, rightness, virtue and justice might consist in, they shared a commitment to seeing morality as a wholly natural phenomenon and they all saw moral judgment as a matter of thinking that actions, institutions, or characters had some particular natural property or other.
It views morality as a kind of bank account.
It's been harder to dismiss morality as a phantom concern, too.
They used sexual morality as a weapon and now it's shooting them in the foot.
