Sentence examples for moral sentence from inspiring English sources

Use of a moral sentence does not communicate that the speaker believes the proposition expressed by that sentence.

According to the hermeneutic fictionalist a speaker uttering a false moral sentence is typically not expressing a belief in the content expressed by the sentence.

But it is not so easy to see how to carry this over to the treatment of accepting a moral judgment in the absence of uttering a moral sentence.

A generalized version of Speaker Subjectivism is Metaethical Contextualism, according to which the content of a moral sentence of the form "A ought to f" is a proposition to the effect that A ought to f relative to standards S, where S is determined by the context of utterance (Dreier 1990; Björnsson and Finlay 2010).

Noncognitivists have proposed various alternative theories of meaning for moral sentences.

Noncognitivism, Denial of the characteristic cognitivist thesis that moral sentences are used to express factual statements.

In Language, Truth and Logic (1936), A. J. Ayer stated the emotivist thesis that moral sentences are not statements at all (see emotivism).

Let us call such sentences "atomic moral sentences".

Moral sentences are regarded as genuinely truth-apt.

Simply put this thesis denies that predicative moral sentences express propositions or have substantial truth conditions.

The error theorist is typically characterized as holding that all atomic moral sentences are false.