The moral, in general terms, is that in cases of incommensurability (or cases in which it is tempting to treat two alternatives as incommensurable), decisions that seem individually defensible can, when combined, result in a series of decisions that fit together very poorly relative to the agent's large-scale, ongoing concerns.
As Declan put it, "Regardless of whether your state has gun laws, I think everyone with a soul and with morals in general are able to see the fact that this is completely horrible".
While admitting the cogency of all of these objections, Savulescu and Persson insist that their intention is "simply to put moral enhancement in general, and moral bioenhancement in particular, on the table," not to provide "a definitive and detailed solution".
(See Hare 1981, Campbell 1985, Gibbard 1990, and Blackburn 1998 for theories of moral justification compatible with non-cognitivism and the entry on moral skepticism for a discussion of moral justification in general).
Despite this diversity among the views that get labeled "moral skepticism", many people have very strong feelings about moral skepticism in general.
While those who answer these questions tend to focus on the transferability of collective responsibility and its relationship to individual moral agency in general, they do not ignore concrete historical examples in which the moral responsibility of particular groups of individuals for harm is in question.
Still, we know that we humans are notoriously inconsistent creatures, willing to take positions, in the particular, that conflict with our moral principles in general.
Pope Benedict XVI's visit to the U.K. this week fascinates me for its historic significance, but I can't help wondering why we crave such visits by religious or moral leaders in general.
The first example illustrates entrepreneurs' moral responsibility in general; the passage refers to responsibility towards society.
Indeed, according to her, moral discourse in general is infected with error.
Rawls thinks that political liberalism extends freedom of religion to moral worldviews in general.
