Sentence examples for moral hazard effects from inspiring English sources

The status quo is characterized by the absence of any measures designed to counteract these moral hazard effects.

However, health insurance and sick leave pay cause consumer incentives to be reflected in moral hazard effects of several types.

Strong evidence of moral hazard effects of UI is provided also by the evidence on the effects of financial incentives and benefit sanctions.

By decomposing welfare gains of increasing benefit level to liquidity and moral hazard effects, Chetty (2008) offers a new approach to value benefits of UI.

In the classic formulation and extensions, optimal benefit generosity reflects a tradeoff between the welfare gains arising from insurance against income loss versus the disincentive or moral hazard effects of UI benefits on job search (Baily 1978, Chetty 2008).

Second, for beneficiaries using solidarity fund, the unemployment duration dependence pattern is consistent with moral hazard effects, and for beneficiaries relying on UISAs only, the pattern is free of such effects.

Finally, there may be a dynamic moral hazard effect (choice biased in favor of new, usually more expensive medical technology).

For instance, Schmieder et al. (2012) show that the moral hazard effect of unemployment insurance benefits is significantly lower in recessions than in booms.

Recent research suggests that this tradeoff may depend on labor market conditions, for example through reduced arrival rates of job offers under weak labor market conditions that limit the moral hazard effect on job search.

The liquidity effect allows the recipient to choose a level of effort compatible with complete markets (that is, allows liquidity constrained individuals to search for a job longer), the effect that is efficiency enhancing; the moral hazard effect reflects reduced incentives due to the price subsidy of leisure introduced by unemployment benefits, the effect that is efficiency distorting.

My finding of little or no impact of the extensions on job finding is relevant in this regard, suggesting that the adverse moral hazard effect of UI on job search is greatly outweighed by the favorable liquidity and social insurance effects (Chetty 2008, Card et al. 2007).