Does there come a point when a brand becomes so large, with so much cultural influence, that it has a moral duty to include disability?
Why are cognitive disability and moral status thought to be sufficiently connected to warrant a separate entry?
There is an important caveat to this argument however, namely that the moral hazard problems in disability insurance programs probably become more severe in cyclical downturns.
A respect-based account might also exclude psychopaths if it attributed their moral deficits to severe disabilities in practical reason.
Both characters belong to an unpleasant tradition of equating moral and physical deformity or disability, continued in the 20th century by, for example, Ian Fleming's scarred Bond villains and Peter Sellers's wheelchair-bound eponymous scientist in Dr Strangelove.
Andrew Chevalier plays the wicked Franz as a snickering demon who uses physical disability to justify moral defectiveness, and Tom Radford as Karl has more than a touch of Hamlet's mix of dither and danger – he even greets his imprisoned father as if he were a ghost.
Recent evidence from the Scandinavian countries suggests that requiring sick/disabled individuals to exploit their remaining (reduced) work capacity significantly reduces moral hazard problems in temporary disability (sick leave) insurance.
If human beings with radical cognitive disabilities have full moral status by virtue of belonging to a group with the norm of rationality, then a rational Martian, no less than a rational human, should recognize the full moral status of human beings with radical cognitive disabilities.
All moral agents, causing others pain or disability, and depriving others of freedom or pleasure are morally wrong without some justification.
A weaker version of the derivative or courtesy position does not claim that a human being with radical cognitive disabilities actually has full moral status even for close family members, merely that they must treat her as if she did.
