Results from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies by Greene et al. (2004) and Greene et al. (2001) were interpreted as revealing a dissociation between fast emotional responses and subsequent cognitive modulations in moral cognition.
Kohlberg's cognitive developmental work on moral cognition (1969) reflects this spirit.
A cognitive-affective dissociation of moral cognition is also supported clinically by the psychopathic population's immoral behavior in everyday life despite excellent moral reasoning skills (Cleckley 1941; Hare 1993).
More specifically, we parsed the neural correlates of moral cognition by reference to a socio- cognitive framework, exemplified by ToM cognition, and a socio- affective framework, exemplified by empathy.
In this paper we argue that recently the situation has evolved in a way that subverted the insufficient knowledge on the basic organization of moral cognition in brain circuits, making the project of modeling morality in neurocomputational terms feasible.
Consistent with the demonstrated functional dissociation between cognitive and affective subsystems of the neural network related to moral cognition observed in our study, frontotemporal dementia has been reported to impair personal but not impersonal moral reasoning (Mendez et al. 2005).
(Goldman 2006)What is the neural basis of moral cognition?
Recent work in embodied moral cognition challenges this paradigm.
Although we don't discuss moral cognition here, these findings bear on the infant's empathy and readiness for moral evaluations.
A sample of attorneys also gives no hint of selection socialization. Instead, differences in moral cognition seem to be most relevant when people are making a choice of profession and less so after entering a particular profession.
However, since neuroimaging techniques only allow correlative statements, the functional contribution of the aPFC to deception and moral cognition remains elusive.
