Sentence examples for moral assertions from inspiring English sources

Moral philosophers from Joseph Butler to G.E. Moore have held that moral assertions record knowledge of a special kind.

It can be argued that this would not cause you to change your practice of making moral assertions.

If moral assertions have no truth-value, then it is hard to see how they can fit into truth-functional contexts, such as negation, disjunction, and conditionals.

Even expressivists such as Gibbard [1990] and Blackburn [1998] acknowledge that moral assertions are not personal and that the individual has no sovereignty over them.

Insofar as the non-cognitivist holds that moral assertions are appropriate when and only when a person has an appropriate noncognitive attitude, the presence of that attitude constitutes (part of the) truth condition for the utterance.

Error theorists and skeptics about moral truth-aptness disagree about the content of moral assertions, but they still agree that no substantive moral claim or belief is true, so they are both skeptics about moral truth.

But the fossil fuel divestment campaign does not only make a moral assertion; it makes an economic one.

As for Jafar Panahi's film made — largely with his iPhone — while under house arrest in Tehran, it pushes outraged reason to a furious pitch of imagination; it turns cinematic form into a moral assertion.

How and why they did so is the subject of "The Artful Recluse: Painting, Poetry, and Politics in 17th-Century China," a compelling show at Asia Society — and a highlight of this year's Asia Week New York — that applies a magnifying glass to a familiar theme and reveals a weave of moral assertion and private emotion that has pertinence for new art today.

as a moral assertion, is to take a realistic attitude to moral discourse: there are moral facts, making moral statements objectively true or false.

Although the two views are not incompatible (Ayer denied that moral claims were assertions, and the redundancy of the truth-predicate held only for assertions) the tension between the two is symptomatic of the worry that moral claims have so many of the features of truth-evaluable assertions that one has to be unjustifiably revisionist in construing them as non-meaningful.