Flavonoids might be "a modal" for the drug design.
All of these objections to modal criteria for ontological commitment have a common source: ontological commitment appears to be sensitive to distinctions that metaphysical necessity cannot accommodate.
This answer has consequences for a friend of Modal Criterion.
Modal Criterion is controversial.
Modal Criterion is then satisfied.
See (Read 2001) for an account of Pseudo-Scotus 'paradox', where it is also argued that this so-called paradox did not obtain the desired effect of violating the modal criterion.
There will also be a modal entailment criterion for commitment to particulars: A theory T is ontologically committed to a iff T necessarily implies that a exists iff, for every (metaphysically) possible world w, T is true at w only if a is in the domain of w.
This emphasizes the need for comprehensive multi-modal data.
Third, the modal criteria may introduce spurious commitment if there are metaphysically necessary connections between distinct kinds of entity.
First, just as extensional criteria could not distinguish between ontological commitments to co-extensional kinds, the modal criteria cannot distinguish between ontological commitments to co-intensional kinds.
