Moore's "naturalistic fallacy" discussed in Principia Ethica differs significantly from the mistaken inference of an ought-statement from an is-statement.
While there might be good reasons for the law to treat people differently even if what they do depends on factors beyond their control, we (understandably) make the mistaken inference that the law directly reflects correct moral assessment in such cases.
However, the fact that we do make such a mistaken inference explains why we often commit ourselves to the existence of moral luck, when reflection can show that doing so is a mistake.
According to Chambers, "reasonable mind[s]" will quickly perceive that "the prevalent ideas about the organic creation" were simply "a mistaken inference from the text," meaning the first verses of the Bible.
According to Hintikka (1997) it is an outright mistake to think of Aristotle's fallacies primarily as mistaken inferences, either deductive or inductive.
Even when officials make correct judgments about which acts to excuse, citizens may draw mistaken inferences, and restraints of deterrence and norm acceptance may be weakened for unjustified acts that resemble justified ones (Greenawalt, 1987, 273).
To explore the effect of projection bias on product valuation, we designed an experiment to test whether mistaken inferences about whether current states will also be felt at future points in time would appear as an effect on a subject's WTP for a perishable food product.
Bias in GC-content and other sequence composition patterns can produce dramatic peaks or troughs in coverage, as we observed over centromeres and across transcripts, potentially leading to mistaken inferences about the underlying biology.
Isn't the history of thought littered with what have turned out to be deeply mistaken claims, inferences and platitudes that people at the time have found "rationally" and/or "primitively compelling," say, with regard to God, sin, biology, sexuality, or even patterns of reasoning themselves?
When stimulating one neuron in layer 0, activity can spread over a wide range of L0 and L1, and this allows the four types of causal inference error previously described, i.e. mistaken dependence, transitive inference, reciprocal interference and causal dominance.
Proponents of the traditional view that cognition is skull-bound have argued, in reply, both that this inference is mistaken and the view it leads to is implausible and metaphysically extravagant (Rupert 2009b; Adams and Aizawa 2008; Aizawa 2007).
