Some Methodological Naturalists want to do away with normative justification theories and to replace them with empirical and descriptive explanatory accounts.
Second, how far do methodological naturalists need to allow that mathematics, morality and modality constitute exceptions to their position in the first place?
If this were right, then they would be capable of challenging the kind of synthetic theses that methodological naturalists take philosophy to involve.
How far do methodological naturalists in fact need to allow that modality and mathematics and first-order morality do have a different status from the synthetic a posteriori character they attribute to philosophy in general?
In general it seems rational to agree with the methodological naturalists that the best hope for a theoretical understanding of the world is by pursuing the methods which are typical of the sciences.
Methodological naturalists can take the same line with philosophical claims.
Methodological naturalists (M-naturalists) view philosophy as continuous with empirical inquiry in the sciences.
As we will see below, contemporary physicalists are often methodological naturalists, and methodological naturalists may well hold the attitude Ney describes.
But as Johnson himself notes, many people think that they can be methodological naturalists and theists.
