In this way, she communicated the distinction between mental strength (the processing power of the brain) and mental character (the mental virtues that lead to practical wisdom).
If this means that the cause has a mental property (in virtue of which it satisfies a mental description) and a physical property (in virtue of which it satisfies a physical description), we are faced with a further question.
Thus, James alluded to intentionality, the feature of some mental processes in virtue of which they are essentially about or directed toward an object.
Husserl's aim was to give an exact description of the phenomenon of intentionality, or the feature of conscious mental states by virtue of which they are always "about," or "directed toward," some object.
Furthermore, there seems to be no formal characteristic of a mental act in virtue of which it can non-trivially be said to resemble anything else.
Whether this strong critique is accepted or not, it is evident that removing a reason for objecting to efficacy of mental events in virtue of their mental properties does not by itself provide a positive reason for asserting such efficacy.
Presumably, a person may have conscious access to one of her A-conscious mental states in virtue of having some other mental state (e.g., a thought or belief) directed to it.
There is no intrinsic feature of the mental image in virtue of which it is about any given thing; if there were, Abelard notes, we could determine by inspection what a sign is about but we can't.
Philosophical inquiry into intentionality — that feature of beliefs, desires, and other mental states, in virtue of which they are of or about something — begins long before recent debates about mental content or even the work of phenomenologists towards the beginning of the twentieth century.
If we say 'No', on the other hand, then the mouse's perception of the cat will be sufficient for the mouse to count as conscious of the cat; but we may have to say that although it is conscious of the cat, the mental state in virtue of which it is so conscious is not itself a conscious one!
