An informational theory of content must therefore explain how mental representations represent distal features of the world, as opposed to the more proximal items that carry information about those distal features to the representations that represent them.
In effect, those who propose teleological theories of mental content try to say why a mental representation, R, represents what it represents, C, by filling in the blank in, "R has the content C because (in virtue of) _______", without making ineliminable use of intentional terms.
Another is to accept that causal role determines the representational status of a mental state (i.e., that it is a representation) but does not fully specify representational content (i.e. how that representation represents things as being); but this seems to involve abandoning full-blown functionalism.
In general, a theory of content tries to say why a mental representation counts as representing what it represents.
This mental representation could be related to the different aspects of the entrepreneurial process.
Comparing the linear coefficient (RLin) and logarithmic coefficient (RLn), for each child, it could be determined which model best represented each child's mental representation.
Especially the subscales representing the psychosocial function "mental representation", split into the domains "emotional" (part of Discontinuity; 1.3) and "cognitive" (part of Incoherence; 2.3), showed a different pattern compared to the other subscales.
Sensation is how we represent sensory stimuli at the surface of our bodies — the mental representation of "what's happening to me"; perception, by contrast, is how we represent the outside world, "what's happening out there".
These theories begin with the idea that there are mental representations and that thoughts are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and some part of the world that is represented.
For each rank bin, we averaged its associated mental representation parameters, replotted them on the template face, and represented the proportion of representations drawn from younger (red bars) and older (blue bars) participants on each image of Figure 2.
