Sentence examples for mental representation is from inspiring English sources

Though not ultimately successful, a first and plausible reply to the representation problem is to deny that mental representation is a problem for an overarching naturalism on the grounds that representational capacities are to be found throughout the natural, physical world.

The forms inside and outside my mind are the same, suggesting that mental representation is symmetrical.

The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science.

One view that adapts, rather than dispenses with, the notion of mental representation is Lawrence Barsalou's perceptual symbols theory (1999, 2003, 2008, 2009).

Fodor, of course, is the leading proponent of the view that all mental representation is, or depends upon, mentalese, the amodal language of thought.

Of course, their hope is also to show that the phenomenon of mental representation is naturalistic, and in a similar way.

It is on the foundation of the thusly proven notion of a proper function that biosemantic theories of mental representation are constructed.

Second, it is pointed out that current accounts of mental representation are untenable or, at least, controversial and that there is no obvious reason to think that there will ever be a generally accepted account of mental representation.

Again, biosemantic theories of mental representation are distinguished from others by their mode of explanation: they seek to naturalize the aboutness of thought by appealing to the evolutionary, biological function of the neural states and processes that realize these thoughts.

The main attempts to specify what makes a causal-informational state a mental representation are Asymmetric Dependency Theories (e.g., Fodor 1987, 1990a, 1994) and Teleological Theories (Fodor 1990b, Millikan 1984, Papineau 1987, Dretske 1988 , 1995.

If, however, a mental representation's having a particular content is due to factors extrinsic to it, it is unclear how its having that content could determine its causal powers, which, arguably, must be intrinsic (see Stich 1983, Fodor 1982 , 1987 1994).