Sentence examples for mental notions from inspiring English sources

Eliminative materialists claim that this is precisely what will happen with at least some of our folk mental notions.

Like many of his contemporaries, Feyerabend argued that common-sense mental notions are essentially non-physical in character.

Like Feyerabend, Quine also endorsed the idea that mental notions like belief or sensation could simply be abandoned in favor of a more accurate physiological account.

In Lewis's account, our commonsense mental notions can be treated as functionally defined theoretical terms that appear in a chain of Ramsey-sentences.

Moreover, while eliminativists have typically framed the vulnerability of commonsense mental notions in terms of a false folk psychological theory, it is important to note that, at least in principle, eliminativism does not require such an assumption.

You can either claim that common sense mental notions do not pick out anything real and that mental terms are empty, in which case you are a true eliminative materialist; or you can claim that mental notions can be, in some way, reduced to neurological (or perhaps computational) states of the brain, in which case you are really just a good-old fashioned materialist/reductionist.

Finally, a major attraction of logics of knowledge in computer science has been the concrete grounding of the mental notion in objective phenomena; by reducing belief to knowledge we obtain this grounding for a notion of belief.

Drawing connections, one might argue that states appear in the stream of consciousness only in so far as we are aware of them, and thus forge a bond between the first meta-mental notion of a conscious state and the stream or narrative concept.

In order to do that, we use Barsalou's notion of mental simulation and Gärdenfors' notion of conceptual spaces such that, together with ESOM neural networks, a cognitive architecture can be developed, where mental concepts formation and lexicon formation are able to co-evolve during a language game.

Unconscious or proto-mental acts as opposed to conscious mental acts are notions sometimes used to underline this difference.

They can be considered the ideal link between the syntactic notion of mental content and the computational notion of functional architecture.