Thus, there are no mental facts over and above physical facts.
So, for Fine, in claiming that certain physical facts ground the mental facts, we remain neutral on whether there really are any mental facts because in making grounding claims we remain neutral on whether there are any facts whatsoever.
And if fixing the physical facts is alone enough to fix the mental facts, then a zombie world seems impossible.
So, on his conception of grounding, in claiming that certain physical facts ground the mental facts we remain neutral on whether there really are any mental facts in the first place.
But surely any adequate formulation of non-reductive physicalism should take a stand on whether there really are mental facts.
On the other hand, emergentist wants to agree with the physicalist that mental facts are necessitated by, and so supervene on, the physical facts.
On the one hand, the emergentist wants to say that mental facts and physical facts are metaphysically distinct just as a standard dualist does.
(Cf. Hawthorne 2002, Leuenberger 2008) Imagine a possible world similar to ours with respect to the distribution of mental and physical properties, except for this difference: the relation between physical facts and mental facts is weaker than supervenience mental facts are entailed by physical facts so long as there are no facts which block that entailment blockers, as they are called.
In this case we get the sort of asymmetry between non-reductive physicalism about the mental and non-reductive phenomenalism about the mathematical that we want: the mental facts are plausibly grounded in physical facts, yet the mathematical facts aren't plausibly grounded in mental facts.
They have to say that by fixing the purely physical facts, God did everything that was needed to fix the mental facts about the organisms thereby created, including their thoughts, feelings, emotions, and experiences.
