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We investigate the mechanism design problem when the agents and the mechanism have computational restrictions.
To address this issue, we model multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation.
This paper analyzes optimal stopping as a mechanism design problem with transfers.
This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations.
We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns.
Finally, the model is used to study a mechanism design problem in a large economy with private information.
Similar(35)
We consider mechanism design problems with n agents when the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to an allocation function.
This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems.
Two mechanism design problems are given to test the proposed method.
In this paper we study the effects of bounded rationality in mechanism design problems.
That is, in mechanism design problems with multiple agents the use of direct mechanisms may be suboptimal.
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