But he does not suppose that monads are necessarily minds or intellects, hence a dualism of monads is at least possible.
Since there is a hierarchy among monads within any animal, from the soul of a person down to the infinitely small monad, the relation of domination and subordination among monads is a crucial feature of both Leibniz's idealism and his panorganicism.
Leibniz' contribution to this point in his theory of monads is an attempt to singularize individuals by a complete enumeration of their qualities [ 2], p. 235.
In other words, since monads are not 'things' but 'subjects,' the argument against direct monadic interaction is blatantly invalid.
Monads are "windowless" and neither admit nor emit causal influence.
Monads are used for enrichment of DB structure, while comonads work in the model of computations.
Since monads are to be differentiated in terms of their perceptions, one natural reading would simply be that suggested in the paragraph above: monad x is dominant over monad y when x has clearer perceptions than y.
Although later Wolffians, such as Friedrich Baumeister, would eventually refer to Wolff's atomic elements as "monads," there is at least one important respect in which Wolff's atomic elements are different from Leibniz's monads.[77] Leibniz conceives monads as simple unextended substances, and hence Leibnizian monads are "windowless" substances that do not interact or influence one another.
Physical monads are thus elementary energy spheres (sphaera activatis or ambitum activitatis; 1 481.9 10, 37).
Monads are more or less perfect depending upon the clarity of their perceptions, and a monad is dominant over another when the one contains reasons for what happens in the other.
