Another question concerns the implications from 'ought'-statements to meaning statements.
Meaning statements, such as "'Green' means green", Millar argues, are true in virtue of there being a rule-governed practice.
It is clear that the type of normativity Kripke has in mind is meaning engendered normativity, or ME normativity; i.e., the claim is that meaning statements such as 'expression e means M for S' have normative consequences, leaving it open whether the norms are prior to meaning or not.
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Gerry L. Alexander said the flaw in the law was that it penalized false "nondefamatory speech," meaning statements that do not injure reputation.
An alternative strategy is to suggest that meaning statements simply are prescriptions.
Another proposal shuns the metaphysical questions concerning the nature of meaning and appeals to the function of meaning statements in our practices (Lance & O'Leary Hawthorne 1997).
Instead of asking for the facts that constitute meaning, it is argued, we should consider the role of meaning statements in our socio-linguistic practices.
For example, although Gibbard (2012) construes meaning statements as having a prescriptive content he denies that this has any metaphysical implications for the nature of meaning.
Kripke suggests that we should reject the search for meaning facts and consider the conditions under which meaning statements are properly assertible (Kripke 1982: 69 79).
For instance, the question arises whether the claim that meaning statements lack descriptive content can accommodate the role of such statements in inferential contexts.
These difficulties are avoided if, instead, meaning statements are simply construed as having a prescriptive use (while having a descriptive content).
