His first formulation of a criterion of meaning, the principle of verification, was in the first edition of LTL (1936), where he claimed that all propositions were analytic (true in virtue of their meaning) or else either strongly verifiable or weakly verifiable.
Thus, by the time of "Meaning and Verification", he had moved well beyond his 'Form and Content' stage, modulating the virulent Positivism of his earlier thinking, to arrive at a more mature and balanced conception of the issues at the focus of his philosophical concerns (Oberdan 1996, Sec. 5).
In addition to the technical difficulties surrounding the proper formulation of the meaning-criterion, Ayer later acknowledged that he had been vague as to whether the criterion was intended in a 'weak' or 'strong' sense: if weak, verifiability merely demarcated sense from nonsense, whilst the strong version meant that the method of verification provided the meaning of the sentence.
Following is a short explanation of two main aspects of Albo's theory of law that the academic literature covers: the concept of natural law, its origins, meaning and influence; and the method of verification of divine law.
Affirmations, as acts of verification or giving meaning, lacked logical inferential force; in Schlick's words, they 'do not occur within science itself, and can neither be derived from scientific propositions, nor the latter from them' (Schlick 1934, 95).
More generally Gödel was against verificationism, namely the idea that the meaning of a statement is its mode of verification.
Legal positivism is here sometimes associated with the homonymic but independent doctrines of logical positivism (the meaning of a sentence is its mode of verification) or sociological positivism (social phenomena can be studied only through the methods of natural science).
In 1930, considerations of this sort appeared to receive a considerable boost due to Waisman's reports of Wittgenstein's pronouncement that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification.
This standpoint was associated with the view that the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification (see the section on Verificationism in the entry on the Vienna Circle).
(Wittgenstein discussed the thesis "The meaning of its sentence is its verification" in conversations with Schlick and Waismann on 22 December 1929 and 2 January 1930 (see Waismann 1967 [1979]).
