President Obama, the champion of the T.P.P., may grant that certain provisions of the deal might be strengthened in favor of American standards without agreeing with "Our Revolution" on what's bathwater and what's baby.
In particular, they may grant that this often happens when the parties to a moral dispute share a moral framework.
We may grant that obligations result from demands, but only if we emphasize (as Adams does) that it is demands from authorities that result in obligations.
Second, we may grant that considerations of tractability reveal that scientific and mathematical standards are more truth-conducive in their respective spheres.
For years coastal states have lobbied for federal legislation to help insure their citizenry, and the newly elected Democratic Congress may grant that wish.
In response to the second point, they may grant that the negation of a law is conceivable, but deny that conceivability is a good guide to possibility (see the entry Epistemology of Modality).
Thus, while one may grant that rudimentary capacities ground some moral status, one must look beyond such capacities to explain the difference in moral status between humans and most animals.
One may grant that nothing satisfies all of our desiderata regarding moral concepts, but the question remains whether any response-dependent concepts will satisfy enough of those desiderata to count as worthy and practicable surrogates.
One may grant that there are non-conceptual sensory experiences of objects in one's external environment while doubting one has anything analogous regarding the 'inner' landscape of mind.
Although the Christian exclusivist, we are told, may grant that those with whom he is in disagreement have not violated any epistemic duty and may know of no arguments that would convince those with whom he is in disagreement that they are wrong and he is right, the exclusivist is likely to believe that he "has been epistemically favored in some way".
That is, one may grant that we can have obligations to institutions, including the state, yet hold that these obligations are "too weak to function as prima facie political obligations in the usual sense," for they "would be overridden frequently, not just in unusual circumstances" (Klosko 1989, p. 355).
